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THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT: CAN WHISTLE BLOWERS 
REACH STATE AND LOCAL TAX DOLLARS? 
JOHN R. HELLOW* 
STACIE K. NERONI** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing use of the False Claims Act (“FCA” or “Act”)1 by both 
whistle blowers and federal officials extracts hundreds of millions of dollars 
from health care providers owned by states and local governments.2  In most 
instances, these cases cost health care providers many times what they 
collected through Medicare and Medicaid billings.3  These “recoveries” can 
 
* John Hellow is a partner at the law firm of Hooper, Lundy & Bookman and has a Masters in 
health care administration.  He has been representing health care clients in government payment 
disputes since 1982.  Additionally, Mr. Hellow has represented clients in some of the largest civil 
and criminal fraud investigations in the industry’s history. 
** Stacie Neroni is an associate at the law firm of Hooper, Lundy & Bookman.  She has been 
assisting health care providers to resolve various legal difficulties including Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursement and other regulatory and compliance issues. 
  Both authors would like to thank Julie Schollenberger, who is an associate at Hooper, 
Lundy & Bookman for her generous and invaluable comments on the early drafts of this article. 
 1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994). 
 2. The anecdotal evidence suggests that some institutions now forego Federal payments 
from Medicare, Medicaid and Civil Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services 
(“CHAMPUS”) for some health services because the complexity of billing and documentation 
requirements pose a significant risk of exposure to extreme liability under the FCA. 
 3. During a recent initiative, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania contacted a majority of Pennsylvania hospitals concerning alleged improper 
Medicare billings of outpatient hospital services provided within seventy-two hours of an 
admission.  The government contended that such outpatient services were not separately billable 
because of the subsequent inpatient stay.  One small Pennsylvania hospital was advised that if it 
chose to litigate the alleged false claims violation, it could be liable for almost $5 million in 
damage multiples and penalties, but that it could avoid such devastating consequences by paying 
multiple damages in the amount of $50,000.  While this is an extreme example of the initiative, 
ultimately over 4,600 hospitals were the target of that effort and fines and penalties, if calculated 
under the FCA, in many instances were in excess of ten times actual damages.  See, e.g., Jeff 
McGaw, Hospitals Bemoan the Use of False Claims Act, PATRIOT NEWS-HARRISBURG, Oct. 4, 
1998 at D03, available in 1998 WL 6481692; Jack Sherzer, Crackdown on Hospital Overbilling 
is City-based: Feds Here Orchestrate $130 Million Effort, PATRIOT NEWS-HARRISBURG, Dec. 8, 
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seriously jeopardize the funding of state and local government programs.4  The 
Circuits have split on two questions critical to the enforcement of the False 
Claims Act against state government entities: 1) whether states are “persons” 
subject to liability under the Federal False Claims Act; and 2) whether a qui 
tam relator, or “whistle blower,” is barred from suing a state by the Eleventh 
Amendment.5  The Supreme Court is set to decide these questions this term in 
United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources.6  
Because even the statutory construction is colored by constitutional concerns 
of sovereign immunity, states should be comforted by the fact that their 
liability under the FCA will be decided by the same Court that decided Alden 
v. Maine,7 College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board,8 and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board v. College Savings Bank.9  This Article examines the considerations the 
Court should address in deciding whether Congress intended the FCA to 
extend liability to the states and, if so, whether suits maintained by a qui tam 
relator, without government intervention, violate Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity concerns. 
Shortly before oral argument in Stevens, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion 
in United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital.10  In Riley, the 
Fifth Circuit held that a relator action under the FCA violated the Take Care 
Clause of Article II of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine.11  
Additionally, the majority rejected the dissent’s argument that “qui tam actions 
in which the government does not intervene are constitutionally acceptable as 
valid delegations of executive authority.”12  The majority explained that “there 
is no real delegation of executive authority in such cases.  Congress cannot be 
 
1996, at B1, available in 1996 WL 5712712; Pa. Hospitals Overbilling for Medicare, YORK 
DAILY REC., Jan. 13, 1995, at 2, available in 1995 WL 4892385. 
 4. For example, a recent government audit into allegations that teaching hospitals were 
submitting false Medicare billing statements for services provided by teaching physicians resulted 
in hefty settlements.  The University of Pennsylvania settled with the government for $30 million, 
but did not admit any wrongdoing, Thomas Jefferson University settled for $12 million, the 
University of Virginia settled for $8.6 million, and the University of Pittsburgh settled for $17 
million.  See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. HEHS-98-174, MEDICARE: CONCERNS 
WITH PHYSICIANS AT TEACHING HOSPITALS (PATH) AUDITS (1998) 2. 
 5. The Eleventh Amendment bans the commencement or prosecution of an action by a 
private party against a state.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also discussion infra Part VI. 
 6. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vt. Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 
195 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999). 
 7. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). 
 8. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999). 
 9. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999). 
 10. 196 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc review pending). 
 11. Id. at 531. 
 12. Id. at 530. 
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delegating to relators the President’s power and duty to take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed, for Congress may not delegate purely executive power 
without the acquiescence of the executive.”13  Finally, the court declined to 
decide whether relators could demonstrate Article III standing.  The 
declination to review standing was premised on the Fifth Circuit’s recent 
decision in United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech University,14 where the 
court assumed Article III justiciability for relator actions, thereafter binding 
other panels of the Fifth Circuit on that issue until considered en banc or 
decided by the Supreme Court.  In light of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Riley, 
the Supreme Court in Stevens took the unprecedented step of requesting 
additional briefing on the Article III standing issue, due one day after oral 
argument, on November 30, 1999.15  However, the Fifth Circuit in Riley will 
be addressing both the Article III standing and Article II separation of powers 
issues en banc, unless the Supreme Court addresses the standing issue first in 
Stevens.  The Court may feel compelled to at least address the Article III 
standing issue in light of its decision in Calderon v. Ashmus,16 wherein the 
Court held that Article III justiciability must be addressed before Eleventh 
Amendment issues.17 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT EFFORTS TO INSULATE STATES FROM 
PRIVATE LITIGATION 
The import of state sovereignty in our constitutional system was reaffirmed 
in 1999 by the Court’s decisions in Alden, College Savings, and Florida 
Prepaid.  In Alden, the Court made clear that Congress cannot abrogate a 
state’s sovereign immunity from suit by private parties brought in either 
federal or state court without the state’s consent, unless attempting to remedy 
or prevent constitutional violations.18  Noting that “[t]here are isolated 
statements in some of our cases suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment is 
inapplicable in state court,” the Court either explained away such statements as 
dicta, or characterized a state’s participation in the subject matter of a Federal 
cause of action as a waiver of sovereign immunity by the state.19  After a 
review of the “history, practice, precedent and the structure of the 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).  See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text. 
 15. See False Claims Act: High Court Hears Argument on Right of Qui Tam Whistleblowers 
to Sue States, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) at 1874 (Dec. 2, 1999). 
 16. 523 U.S. 740 (1998). 
 17. Id. at 745 n.2.  Because the Article II issues addressed in Riley are akin to the 
Constitutional Conventions’ concerns with Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, those 
issues will be noted in the discussion of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see infra Part VI.  
Article III standing issues are addressed in Part VIII. 
 18. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2243-44. 
 19. See 119 S. Ct. at 2257-60. 
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Constitution,”20 the Court found no “‘compelling evidence’ that this derogation 
of the States’ sovereignty is ‘inherent in the constitutional compact.’”21 
In College Savings, the Court considered whether Congress, through the 
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (“TRCA”), could create a private right of 
action for false or misleading advertising and specifically impose liability on 
the states.22  The private party argued (1) that the State had damaged its 
property rights through false and misleading advertising in support of the 
State’s own product in the prepaid tuition market,23 and (2) that the State 
constructively waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in such marketing 
efforts knowing that its conduct was subject to suit under the TRCA.24  The 
Court held there is no constitutionally protected property right to fair 
competition within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment that provides a 
linchpin for Congress to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from suit.25  The majority also adopted an approach precluding constructive 
waivers of state sovereign immunity by Congress except in situations where 
the waiver is a condition of a federal grant or gift: 
In any event, we think where the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the 
State’s sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically 
passed—and the voluntariness of the waiver destroyed—when what is attached 
to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful 
activity.26 
Accordingly, the Court “drop[ped] the other shoe” and expressly overruled the 
“constructive waiver” doctrine applied in Parden v. Terminal Railway of 
Alabama Docks Department.27 
The Florida Prepaid Court considered whether the Patent and Plant 
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (“Patent Remedy Act”), which 
extended liability to the states for patent infringement, could be sustained as 
 
 20. Id. at 2266. 
 21. Id. at 2260 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991)). 
 22. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, see 106 Stat. 3567, subjects states to suits 
brought under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
 23. College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. 
 24. Id. at 2227-28. 
 25. Id. at 2225. 
 26. Id. at 2231. 
 27. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).  Parden involved Alabama citizens bringing a Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act (“FELA”) claim against an Alabama owned railroad.  The Court observed that “a 
State’s operation of a railroad in interstate commerce” subjected it to suit because allowing 
employees the ability to sue under FELA but not to extend that right to employees of State owned 
railroads left the employees without “any effective means of enforcing that liability.”  
Accordingly, the Court was “unwilling to conclude that Congress intended so pointless and 
frustrating a result.”  Id. at 190.  The College Savings Court found that “Parden stands as an 
anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, and indeed in the jurisprudence of 
constitutional law.”  College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at 2228. 
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legislation enacted to enforce the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process clause.28  The plaintiff in Florida Prepaid was a patentee who 
alleged that the State damaged the patentee’s property rights through patent 
infringement.29  The court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”30 and also grants Congress the right to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity, through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
giving Congress “the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”31  Accordingly, the Court 
addressed whether the Patent Remedy Act could be justified as appropriate 
enforcement legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.32  The 
Court concluded that Congress had not examined whether adequate remedies 
existed under state law to remedy patent infringement violations by the state; 
therefore, the Patent Remedy Act could not be characterized as appropriate 
under Section 5.33 
This limited review of the 1999 Court’s jurisprudence on states’ sovereign 
immunity evidences an expansionist view of the states’ immunity from suit.  
The outcome of Stevens, however, may signal whether the Court is reaching 
the limits of the sovereign immunity doctrine or still exploring its boundaries. 
III. A SYNOPSIS OF THE QUESTIONS THAT THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
ADDRESS IN STEVENS 
Whether a state, local government, municipality, or one of their agencies 
(“government entities”), is liable under the FCA for submitting false claims to 
the federal government requires resolution of several issues.  The False Claims 
Act provides that “any person who knowingly presents, or causes to be 
presented, . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval . . . is liable 
to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and 
not more than $10,000 per false claim” plus two to three times the 
government’s actual damages and attorneys’ fees.34  The FCA authorizes 
private persons to bring qui tam suits for violations of the Act.35  Several issues 
 
 28. 119 S. Ct. at 2199.  See also Patent Remedy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271-296 (1994 & Supp. 
III 1997). 
 29. Id. at 2203. 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (emphasis added). 
 32. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 33. 119 S. Ct. at 2209.  The Court found that because the Patent Remedy Act swept too 
broadly, it subjected states to “expansive liability” without limiting its coverage to cases with 
arguable constitutional violations “such as where a State refuses to offer any State-court remedy 
for patent owners whose patents it had infringed.”  Id. at 2210. 
 34. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994). 
 35. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). 
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are unique to the application of the FCA to government entities.  The first such 
issue that must be addressed is whether Congress intended the term “person” to 
include other government entities.  General rules of statutory construction are 
complicated by the requirement that Congress be “unmistakably clear” in its 
intention that new legislative burdens will be imposed on states, when doing so 
would disturb the “constitutional balance between the States and the Federal 
Government.”36  This is sometimes referred to as the Clear or Plain Statement 
Rule.37 
Second, even if the Court decides that government entities are “persons” 
under the FCA (thus raising the possibility that these entities are subject to 
liability under the Act), the Eleventh Amendment may still bar suit against 
some government defendants.  While the Eleventh Amendment presents no bar 
to suits commenced or prosecuted by the federal government,38 a qui tam 
relator is merely a private plaintiff who has been authorized by statute to sue 
for injuries sustained by the federal government.  The Eleventh Amendment 
bars suits commenced or prosecuted against states by private plaintiffs in both 
federal and state courts.39  The Supreme Court believes that “the States’ 
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States 
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain 
today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain 
constitutional Amendments.”40  Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether 
the qui tam relator sues for his or her own interests or stands in the shoes of the 
United States government, the real party in interest. 
While the Eleventh Amendment shields states and the arms of state 
government from suit by private plaintiffs, lesser government entities such as 
counties and cities may not be entitled to assert that jurisdictional bar.  This is 
not an issue in Stevens, but some lower courts have developed a common law 
concept protecting these other government entities from punitive damages, 
fines and penalties.  The current trend, however, does not favor that concept.  
 
 36. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
 37. The Court noted that the Plain Statement Rule “is nothing more than an 
acknowledgement that that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional 
scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”  Id. at 461.  For purposes of 
uniformity, this Article will refer to the rule as the “Plain Statement Rule.” 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892); United States v. Mississippi, 380 
U.S. 128 (1965); West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305 (1987). 
 39. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (barring suits brought in 
federal court) and Alden v. Main, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (barring suits brought in state court).  
“In light of the history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the 
States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the 
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.”  Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266. 
 40. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246-47. 
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How the Court will handle this decision may profoundly impact these 
government entities when they enter the health care industry. 
Finally, and an issue common to any FCA suit initiated by a qui tam 
relator, is whether Article III standing is satisfied when a private party, who 
has suffered no personal injury in fact, seeks to redress a public wrong.  While 
the relator receives a bounty in a successful suit, he does not receive damages.  
Damages are the property of the federal government in such suits. 
IV.  THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
A.  The Act of 1863 
One year prior to the original enactment of the FCA, a House Committee 
published a report which, in discussing various frauds committed during the 
Civil War, referred to certain state officials that had used war contracts for 
their personal advantage.41  The report specifically stated that these examples 
of fraud were not committed against the United States government.42  This 
1862 report, however, is a rather tenuous link to the Act Congress passed one 
year later. 
The False Claims Act originated in a statute entitled “An Act to prevent 
and punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States.”43  The Act was 
adopted in 1863 and signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln as a 
measure to combat rampant fraud perpetrated by military contractors during 
the Civil War.44  The original Act distinguished between fraudulent acts 
committed by “any person in the land or naval forces of the United States”45 
and “any person not in the military or naval forces of the United States.”46  
States or political subdivisions thereof would clearly not have fallen within the 
first category, but ostensibly could fall within the second classification.  The 
Act was later codified as part of Title 31 of the United States Code in 1943,47 
and recodified in 1982.48  However, the main portions of the Act had not been 
 
 41. See United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. and Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 876 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 2, 37th Cong., at xxxviii-xxxix (2d Sess. 1862)). 
 42. See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 2, 37th Cong., at xxxviii). 
 43. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (amended and codified at 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3929-3733 (1994)). 
 44. See SEN. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 5266, 5273; see 
also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863) (statement by Senator Howard) (noting that 
“[t]he country . . . has been full of complaints respecting the frauds and corruptions practiced in 
obtaining pay from the Government during the present [Civil War]”). 
 45. See § 1, 12 Stat. at 696. 
 46. See § 3, 12 Stat. at 698. 
 47. See 31 U.S.C. § 232 (Supp. V 1945). 
 48. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 11-12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5276-
77.  The FCA is currently codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994). 
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amended in any substantial respect until the False Claims Amendments Act of 
1986 (“Amendments Act”) was adopted.49 
B. The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 
The Amendments Act was intended to modernize the FCA “to enhance the 
Government’s ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against 
[it] . . . in Federal programs and procurement.”50  The legislative history of the 
Amendments Act noted that the False Claims Act targeted all those who 
submitted false claims to the federal government and specifically used “[t]he 
term ‘person’ . . . to include partnerships, associations and corporations . . . as 
well as State and political subdivisions thereof.”51 
Only three changes in the Amendments Act relate to whether states or 
political subdivisions are included in the definition of “person” when 
determining who may be sued under the Act.  First, Congress changed those 
who could be held liable under the Act from “[a] person not a member of an 
armed force of the United States,” to simply “[a]ny person.”52  Congress made 
this change because at the time the FCA was first enacted in 1863, the 
government had more severe military remedies at its disposal than in 1986.53  
In 1986, the government could not seek monetary recovery from members of 
the armed forces and had to rely on less effective common law remedies.  The 
legislative history does not indicate that this change was intended to broaden 
the class of persons who could be held liable under the FCA, except to include 
members of the armed forces.54 
Second, the Amendments Act increased the FCA’s civil remedies from two 
to three times the amount of damages sustained by the government, and 
increased the penalties from $2,000 per claim to a range of $5,000 to $10,000 
per claim.55  A Congressional Budget Office report, included as part of the 
Amendments Act’s legislative history, noted the proposed increased penalties 
and damages under the Amendments Act, but concluded that the increases 
 
 49. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266. 
 50. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1-2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67. 
 51. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8-9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273-74.  This 
Senate Report cites three cases as authority sufficiently analogous to the proposition that the term 
“person” includes states and political subdivisions: Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 
U.S. 658 (1978); Georgia v. Evens, 316 U.S. 159  (1942); and Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 
(1934).  See id.  None of those decisions, however, concerned liability under the FCA. 
 52. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 206; S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280. 
 53. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280.  
Under the FCA, as it was originally enacted in 1863, members of the armed forces who violated 
the FCA could be court-martialed, fined, and/or imprisoned.  See 12 Stat. at 697. 
 54. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 206-07. 
 55. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5282; 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1986). 
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would “involve no significant costs to the federal government or to state or 
local governments.”56 
Third, the Amendments Act authorized the Department of Justice to issue 
Civil Investigative Demands (“CID”) for documents or testimony in a False 
Claims Act investigation.57  Under the CID provisions, “the term ‘false claims 
law investigation’ means any inquiry conducted . . . for the purposes of 
ascertaining whether any person is engaged in any violation of a false claims 
law.”58  Further, the provision defines “the term ‘person’ [to] include any State 
or political subdivision of a State.”59 
V. DID CONGRESS INTEND FOR THE FCA TO IMPOSE LIABILITY ON 
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES AS “PERSONS” IN EITHER 1863 OR 1986? 
A. Does the Term “Person” as Used in the FCA Include States and the Arms 
of State Government? 
As already noted, the FCA imposes civil liability on any “person” who 
makes a false monetary claim to the United States government, but 
unfortunately does not define the term “person.”  To determine whether this 
language creates a cause of action against states and their subdivisions, it is 
therefore necessary to ascertain whether Congress intended an expansive or 
narrow reading of the term “person.”  A narrow reading of the term should not 
subject state government entities to suit or liability—either by a qui tam relator 
or the federal government. 
1. A Survey Of Recent Decisions 
The courts are divided on the issue of whether states are “persons” under 
the FCA.  In 1998, both the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Stevens v. 
State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,60 and the Eighth Circuit in 
United States ex rel. Zissler v. Regents of University of Minnesota,61 held that 
states are “persons” subject to liability under the Act.  In that same year, while 
the Second Circuit decision in Stevens was still pending, the Southern District 
of New York, in United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York,62 held that 
states are not “persons” for purposes of liability under the Act.  In 1999, the 
 
 56. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5302 (letter 
from Rudolph G. Panner, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to Senator Strom Thurmond, 
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, June 12, 1986). 
 57. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 33 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5298; 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3733(a)(1) (1986). 
 58. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733(s)(2) (1986) (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. § 3733(s)(4) (1986). 
 60. 162 F.3d 195 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
 61. 154 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 62. 8 F. Supp.2d 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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D.C. Circuit in United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business and Technical 
Institute, Inc.63 similarly held that states are not “persons” under the Act. 
In Stevens, a Vermont agency appealed a district court’s order denying its 
motion to dismiss a FCA qui tam action.64  The private plaintiff alleged that the 
agency, which received federal funds to pay for salary expenses incurred in 
connection with certain federal grants, submitted false claims to the United 
States government by instructing its employees working on the grant projects 
to complete timesheets matching previously calculated estimates, regardless of 
the amount of time actually worked.65  The Vermont agency argued that the 
case should be dismissed because a state agency was not a “person” under the 
Act.66  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the agency’s 
motion, holding that a state is a “person” within the meaning of the Act.67  In 
reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned that states bring suits as plaintiffs 
under the Act, which uses the same term “person” to describe both those who 
may be sued and those who may sue; thus, since a state is a “person” for 
purposes of suing under the Act, it is also a “person” subject to liability under 
the Act.68 
Although the Second Circuit considered the application of the Plain 
Statement Rule to the term “person” under the FCA, it refused to apply that 
rule.  As understood by the Second Circuit, the Plain Statement Rule provides 
“that if Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the 
States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so 
‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”69  The court concluded 
that the Plain Statement Rule applies only when the statute being interpreted 
alters the constitutional balance between the states and the federal government 
and does not apply to “legislation that does not interfere with traditional State 
authority.”70  Since the Act prohibits acquisition of federal funds through fraud 
and “[t]he States have no right or authority, traditional or otherwise, to engage 
in such conduct,”71 the court reasoned that the Act did not interfere with 
traditional state authority and therefore found the Plain Statement Rule was 
inapplicable.72 
 
 63. 173 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 64. Stevens, 162 F.3d at 198. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 199. 
 67. Id. at 208. 
 68. Id. at 205. 
 69. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero, 473 
U.S. at 242). 
 70. Stevens, 162 F.3d at 204. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 203-04.  See also Zissler, 154 F.3d 870 (holding that a false claims action against a 
state does not fall outside the usual constitutional balance between the states and the federal 
government). 
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In holding that states could be sued by qui tam relators under the Act, the 
Stevens court also rejected the argument that such suits are barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment.  The court noted that even when the United States 
government does not intervene in a qui tam action: (1) it retains the ability to 
impose substantial control over the action; (2) it receives the largest portion of 
any recovery; (3) it is the federal government’s injury which provides the 
measure for damages; and (4) it is the federal government’s name in which the 
suit is brought.73  Therefore, the court held, the United States government 
remains the real party in interest, and suit is not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.74 
In Zissler, an employee brought a qui tam action, in which the United 
States intervened, against a State university claiming the university made false 
and incomplete statements regarding federal research grants.75  The district 
court dismissed the action, holding that the State, and therefore the State-
owned university, was not a “person” for purposes of liability under the FCA 
because the statute did not contain clear language indicating congressional 
intent that states be included in the definition of “person.”76  However, the 
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling.77  The appeals court 
reasoned that the Plain Statement Rule only applies to instances where the 
statute alters the constitutional balance between the states and the federal 
government; however, the court concluded that imposition of liability under 
the Act does not alter that balance.78 
Contrary to Stevens and Zissler, the Southern District of New York 
decision in Graber and the D.C. Circuit in Long found that a state is not a 
“person” under the False Claims Act.  The plaintiff in Graber accused New 
York and New York City, as well as various agencies, of falsifying compliance 
information in order to receive federal funding and reimbursement for foster 
care expenditures.79  The district court dismissed the claims by holding that 
states and their municipalities are not “persons” under the FCA because 
“neither the text of the [Act] nor the legislative history demonstrates that 
Congress has ever actively considered whether to subject states and local 
governments to False Claims Act liability, [much less that Congress clearly 
and] unequivocally decided to do so.”80  The court also relied on the doctrine 
of municipal immunity from punitive or exemplary damages and argued that 
 
 73. Id. at 202. 
 74. Id. at 203. 
 75. See Zissler, 154 F.3d at 871 (explaining the case history prior to appeal).  The United 
States chose to intervene in the action.  Id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 873-75. 
 78. Id. at 874-75. 
 79. See Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 345. 
 80. Id. at 355. 
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the treble damages and penalties authorized by the Act were punitive in nature 
and, therefore, could not be imposed upon a state or municipality.81  Although 
Graber supports the position that states are not persons under the Act, it was 
impliedly overturned by the Second Circuit decision in Stevens.82  Graber is 
also undermined by the fact that it relied heavily on the lower court’s decision 
in Zissler, which was expressly overruled by the Eighth Circuit.83 
The remaining case holding that states are not “persons” under the liability 
section of the FCA is the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Long.  The qui tam relator 
in Long was an employee of a State school auditing company.84  The relator 
claimed that during an audit he discovered that the SCS Business and 
Technical Institute had made false claims to receive federal funding for 
students attending its school.85  He also alleged that his State employer was 
aware of these false claims and conspired with the institute to conceal the 
fraud.86  The D.C. Circuit court noted that the conventional reading of the word 
“person” in the FCA does not include states, and observed that there was no 
affirmative showing by Congress that it intended to include states within the 
meaning of the word “person.”87  Accordingly, the court concluded that states 
could not be held liable under the Act.88  The court asserted that the Second 
Circuit’s analysis in Stevens, which categorized the state function at issue as 
merely the filing of fraudulent claims, was too narrow an interpretation.89  The 
D.C. Circuit applied the Plain Statement Rule and held that, even if states were 
liable under the Act, the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity would bar the 
qui tam suit brought by the private plaintiff, who, the court noted, was a real 
party in interest along with the United States.90 
2. The Application Of Traditional Tools Of Statutory Construction 
Courts construe the meaning of a statutory term such as “person” either by 
reviewing the term’s plain meaning and the Act’s legislative history and 
purpose, or by examining the definition and interpretation of the term in other 
congressional acts.  One court has even posited that a definition may be 
 
 81. Id. at 348-49.  See also discussion under municipal liability in Part V.B. 
 82. The Second Circuit in Stevens did not expressly overrule the lower Graber court because 
that decision was issued immediately before Graber was published. 
 83. See generally Zissler, 154 F.3d 870. 
 84. Long, 173 F.3d at 872. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 874. 
 88. Id. at 889-90. 
 89. Long, 173 F.3d at 887. 
 90. Id. at 889-90. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT 145 
inferred from how other entities, such as the states themselves, have interpreted 
the term.91 
Arguments against including states within the meaning of the term 
“person” for purposes of the Act usually focus on the plain meaning of the 
term “person.”  For example, the Graber court asserted that “[t]he Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that ‘in common usage, the term ‘person’ does not 
include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily 
construed to exclude it.’”92  Ruling that the plain meaning of the term “person” 
does not include states, the court further explained that the “literal text of the 
statute, in short, does not plainly subject states and municipalities to False 
Claims Act liability.”93  However, even courts holding that the plain meaning 
or common usage of the word “person” does not include states or their 
agencies have subsequently gone on to review the legislative history and 
purpose of the Act in an effort to ascertain congressional intent.  Even when 
the common usage of the term “person” does not include states, the Supreme 
Court has noted: 
[T]here is no hard and fast rule of exclusion” of the sovereign . . . and our 
conventional reading of “person” may therefore be disregarded if “[t]he 
purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, [or] the 
executive interpretation of the statute . . . indicate an intent, by the use of the 
term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law.94 
While it has been argued that the legislative history supports the position that 
Congress intended states to be included among those liable for False Claims 
Act violations, both Graber and Long, relying on the Plain Statement Rule, 
posit that this legislative evidence was not strong enough on its own to subject 
states to liability under the Act when Congress had not clearly and expressly 
stated its intent to do so. 
As already noted, the legislative history accompanying the Amendments 
Act indicated that the term “person” should be “used in its broadest sense to 
include partnerships, associations, and corporations . . . as well as States and 
political subdivisions thereof[,]”95 and stated that the Amendments Act was 
intended to increase the government’s ability to recover losses and make the 
Act “a more useful tool against fraud in modern times.”96  The Zissler court 
noted that “modern times” have brought about a significant increase in federal 
 
 91. See Stevens, 119 S. Ct. at 204. 
 92. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian 
Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979)). 
 93. Id. at 352. 
 94. International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 
U.S. 72, 83 (1991) (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1941)). 
 95. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 96. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266. 
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grants to both state and local governments.97  Since the Act was enacted to 
prevent fraud that would result in a financial loss to the United States 
government,98 the court reasoned that it would seem illogical for Congress to 
have amended the Act in an effort to increase its usefulness while at the same 
time restricting its applicability by foreclosing qui tam actions against those 
entities that receive such a large proportion of the federal funds granted.99 
The Graber court argued that the Amendments Act’s legislative history 
“should be accorded little, if any, weight in the interpretation of [the FCA]” 
because it was based on an incorrect interpretation of the Act as it stood before 
being amended in 1986.100  The court explained that the Amendments Act 
itself did not manifest an intent to hold states liable, but rather the legislative 
history simply misconstrued the law as it stood at the time as holding states 
liable as “persons” under the Act. 101  Additionally, the Congressional Budget 
Office report included in the legislative history indicates that while damages 
and penalties were being increased through the Amendments Act, no 
“significant” additional costs were being imposed on the state or local 
governments.102  The Graber court concluded that this evidence strongly 
suggests that Congress as a whole did not contemplate that state and local 
governments would be liable under the FCA.103 
Both Stevens and Zissler compared the FCA’s liability provision’s use of 
the term “person” to its use in the FCA’s Civil Investigation Demand 
provision,104 which defines “person” to include “any State or political 
subdivision of a State,” thereby authorizing discovery demands on states.105  
However, the Graber court argued that since “the very language of the [Civil 
Investigation Demand] provision, . . . plainly states that the definitions 
contained in [the FCA’s Civil Investigation Demand provision] apply ‘[f]or 
purposes of this section,’” the definition of “person” does not apply to other 
sections of the FCA.106  The Zissler court found Graber’s point was not a 
strong enough argument “to carry the day in the context of all the other 
 
 97. Zissler, 154 F.3d at 874. 
 98. See id. (quoting United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968)). 
 99. See id. 
 100. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 353. 
 101. Id. at 353-54. 
 102. Id. at 354.  See also SEN. REP. NO. 99-345, at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 
5266, 5302. 
 103. Id. at 354-55. 
 104. Zissler, 154 F.3d at 875; Stevens, 162 F.3d at 207.  See also supra notes 58-60 and 
accompanying text.  Codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (1994), the Civil Investigation Demand 
provision is based upon a similar provision available to the Department of Justice under the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.  See SEN. REP. NO. 99-345, at 33 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 5266, 5298. 
 105. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733(l)(4) (1994). 
 106. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3733(l) (1994)). 
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considerations.”107  Zissler found little point in Graber’s argument that it 
“makes perfect sense” for the Civil Investigation Demand provisions to apply 
to states as “persons” because those provisions apply not only to “targets” of 
investigations, but also to any “non-target” third parties who may have 
information relevant to an investigation.108  Obviously, the Graber court found, 
it is far less burdensome to allow discovery from a state than to allow suit 
against a state. 
In holding that a state is a “person” subject to liability under the Act, the 
Second Circuit in Stevens observed that the Act uses the same term “person” to 
refer to those who can be sued as well as those who can sue under its 
provisions.109  The Second Circuit found support for its holding in cases where 
states “brought suits under the Act as qui tam plaintiffs, clearly indicating that 
they viewed themselves as ‘person[s]’ within the meaning of [the FCA qui tam 
provision].”110 
3. The Plain Statement Rule 
The Supreme Court has styled the Plain Statement Rule as an “ordinary 
rule of statutory construction [which provides] that if Congress intends to alter 
the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal 
Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the 
language of the statute.’”111  Although Will v. Michigan Department of State 
Police112 and Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon113 were cases involving the 
issue of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court noted 
that the concept has been applied in other contexts.114  For example, “Congress 
must make its intention ‘clear and manifest’ if it intends to pre-empt the 
 
 107. Zissler, 154 F.3d at 875. 
 108. See Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 355 (citing H. REP. NO. 94-1343, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2596, 2597). 
 109. Stevens, 162 F.3d at 204 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730). 
 110. Id.  (citing, for example, United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care Ctr., Inc., 
797 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986), United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 
1984), United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1992)).  
While analyzing the issue using the FCA provisions, the Stevens court ignores the entirely 
different considerations involved in whether states are plaintiffs or defendants under the Act.  As 
plaintiffs, states can vindicate the same concerns as other plaintiffs under the FCA.  As 
defendants, however, a substantial portion of state tax revenues are diverted to a private 
individual, the whistle blower, and the state’s status as a sovereign is denigrated.  It is, moreover, 
irrelevant to the issue of congressional intent that some states construed the term “person” to 
allow them to initiate suit under a different section of the FCA. 
 111. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero 
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
 112. 491 U.S. 58 (1989). 
 113. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
 114. See Will, 491 U.S. at 65. 
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historic powers of the States” or if it desires “to impose a condition on the 
grant of federal moneys” to the states.115  In United States v. Bass, the Supreme 
Court indicated that in traditionally sensitive areas, legislation affecting the 
balance between the federal government and the states requires a “clear 
statement” to ensure that Congress has in fact faced, and intends to bring into 
issue, the critical matters involved in that relationship.116 
In the case of the FCA, both prongs of the Plain Statement Rule are 
brought to bear.  If by enacting the FCA, Congress is creating a private right of 
action against the states, then Eleventh Amendment issues arise, and it is quite 
evident that Congress did not clearly indicate that it intended the FCA to 
impose liability on the states.  On the other hand, if the Eleventh Amendment 
is not implicated, then the Plain Statement Rule should still apply under 
Pennhurst and Bass, because conditions on the grant of federal monies impose 
new burdens on states, and this treads on the sensitive relationship between 
state and federal governments. 
Both the D.C. Circuit in Long and the Southern District of New York in 
Graber agreed that the Plain Statement Rule applied.117  The Graber court 
found that the punitive nature of the treble damages and penalties altered the 
traditional balance between the states, municipalities and the federal 
government.118  In Long, the D.C. Circuit found the linchpin for application of 
the Plain Statement Rule in Will.  Therein, the Court found the Plain Statement 
Rule “particularly applicable” in cases where “it is claimed that Congress has 
subjected the States to liability to which they had not been subject before.”119 
However, in Zissler, the court took the stance that subjecting states to 
punitive damages and penalties under the FCA did not disrupt the balance of 
power revered by the courts in Graber or Long.  The Zissler court stated: 
Nor does the application of the False Claims Act to States constitute coercion, 
thereby disrupting the usual balance of power between the United States and 
the States.  There is no coercion in subjecting States to the same conditions for 
federal funding as other grantees: States may avoid these requirements simply 
by declining to apply for and to accept these funds.  But if they take the King’s 
schilling, they take it cum onere.120 
While the Zissler court may have correctly stated the facts as applied in the 
context of federal grant programs, its reasoning does not apply to the majority 
 
 115. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Pennhurst State 
Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1987)). 
 116. 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971). 
 117. Long, 173 F.3d at 874, 887-89; Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d 355-56. 
 118. See Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d 355-56. 
 119. Long, 173 F.3d at 874 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 64). 
 120. 154 F.3d at 873 (emphasis added). 
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of false claims actions filed in the federal health care context.121  Most such 
cases involve federal reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid programs 
for services provided.  These are not grant programs, but rather reimbursement 
programs for services provided to federal or state/federal program 
beneficiaries.122  Federal health care reimbursement is the type of commercial 
activity that the Court in College Savings found beyond the pale of permissible 
coercion because prohibiting the funding would not be denying a “gift or 
gratuity” under Congress’ Spending Clause power, but rather would be 
excluding a state from otherwise lawful activity.123 
Because the FCA is not tailored to a specific program or activity, perhaps 
application of the Plain Statement Rule should not be dependent on the facts of 
particular cases, for presumably congressional intent would be uniform as to 
the application of the FCA to any frederal program.  Accordingly, if the statute 
reaches any state conduct that would be protected by application of the Plain 
Statement Rule, and it is evident that Congress did not consider the impact on 
states, then that should determine whether states are “persons” under the Act. 
It is reasonably clear in the case of the FCA that Congress failed to 
consider those important questions.  For example, the Congressional Budget 
Office report included in the legislative history of the Amendments Act noted 
that the proposed amendments increased penalties and damages under the Act, 
but still concluded that the Amendments Act would “involve no significant 
costs to the federal government or to State or local governments.”124  Given 
that budget impact statement and the FCA’s lack of clear language of 
congressional intent to affect the rights of states, application of the Plain 
Statement Rule favors avoiding state liability under the FCA. 
B. Does the Term “Person” in the FCA include Counties and 
Municipalities? 
The courts are also divided on the question of whether counties and 
municipalities (“local governments) are “persons” under the FCA.  In 1999, an 
Illinois federal court in United States ex rel. Chandler v. Hektoen Institute for 
 
 121. The Supreme Court has generally applied the permissible coercion analysis as part of its 
Eleventh Amendment analysis, rather than as a part of the Plain Statement Rule. In Will, 
however, the Court noted that the two considerations are similar.  See generally Will, 491 U.S. 58.  
The Zissler court also did not have the advantage of the Court’s analysis in College Savings 
concerning the substantial limitations that the Court placed on the types of coercion Congress 
could impose on states to abrogate their sovereign immunity, although in the context of federal 
grants it appears the court would agree with Zissler. 
 122. For a concise educational review of Medicare and Medicaid, see generally BARRY R. 
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 838-83 (3d ed. 1997 & 
Supp. 1999). 
 123. See College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at 2231. 
 124. S. REP. NO.  99-345, at 37, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5302. 
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Medical Research125 held that a county is a “person” for purposes of liability 
under the Act.  In Chandler, a qui tam relator brought an action against the 
Hektoen Institute (“Institute”) and the county, alleging that the Institute 
misrepresented the progress of a study funded by federal grants.126  The relator 
also alleged that the Institute was noncompliant with the federal regulations 
governing the research project and the grant of funds therefor.127  In holding 
that counties are “persons” under the Act, the court relied on both the 
legislative history of the Act, in particular the previously mentioned 1986 
Senate Report and the FCA’s Civil Investigation Demand provisions, and other 
court decisions holding states were “persons” under the Act.128  This case was 
later appealed and the decision affirmed.129 
In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of California in 
LeVine v. Weis130 held that a county is a “person” under California’s False 
Claims Act.131  In LeVine, a fired teacher who complained about his 
classrooms being unlawfully understaffed brought a wrongful termination 
action against a county school district.132  The court held that California’s False 
Claims Act applied to governmental entities, including the county.133  The 
court reasoned that the California legislature enacted the false claims act to 
protect the public fisc, and in light of that purpose “[t]here is no reason to 
conclude the Legislature intended that the protection afforded to the public 
treasury by [California’s False Claims Act] be denied merely because the 
entity raiding the treasury is a governmental entity.”134  While this case was 
concerned only with California’s False Claims Act, the same argument is 
relevant to the Federal False Claims Act. 
Contrary to the holdings in Chandler and LeVine, the Graber court, in 
keeping with its position that the term “person” does not include states, held 
that the term also does not include municipalities.135  In reaching its decision, 
the Graber court argued that while “municipalities typically are presumed to 
be persons at common law,” the presumption falls when punitive or exemplary 
damages may be imposed.136  The court noted that the common law doctrine of 
municipal immunity from exemplary or punitive damages was “well 
 
 125. 35 F. Supp.2d 1078 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 126. Id. at 1079-80. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1083-84. 
 129. The Supreme Court recently denied the case certiorari.  See 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999). 
 130. 68 Cal. App. 4th 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 131. See CALIF. GOV’T CODE §§ 12650-12655  (West 1992 & Supp. 1999). 
 132. LeVine, 68 Cal. App. 4th at 760-63. 
 133. Id. at 765-66. 
 134. Id. at 765. 
 135. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 354. 
 136. Id. at 348-49. 
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recognized when the False Claims Act was first enacted in 1863”137 as 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 1981: 
It was generally understood by 1871 that a municipality, like a private 
corporation, was to be treated as a natural person subject to suit for a wide 
range of tortious activity, but this understanding did not extend to the award of 
punitive or exemplary damages.  Indeed, the courts that had considered the 
issue prior to 1871 were virtually unanimous in denying such [punitive] 
damages against a municipal corporation.138 
The reasoning behind prohibiting exemplary or punitive awards against 
municipalities for their wrongdoing is set forth in some detail by the Court in 
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.  The Fact Concerts rationale rests on 
the notion that forcing the municipality to pay awards of this nature would 
burden the very same taxpayers for whose benefit the suit had been brought, 
and would not enhance the deterrent effect on the governmental bad actor.139 
This reasoning holds true irrespective of whether the plaintiff is a private 
party or the federal government.  Therefore, whether the term “person” 
includes municipalities may depend on whether courts find the mandatory 
penalties and treble damages authorized by the Act to be punitive or remedial.  
If the authorized damages are considered punitive, and the term “person” is 
read to include municipalities, the result would create a cause of action against 
an entity that could never be utilized due to the common law doctrine barring 
punitive damages against municipalities.  The logical solution would be to 
allow suits against municipalities under the Act but allow only actual damages 
to be imposed.  However, since the FCA expressly provides that if liability is 
established the courts must award at least double damages and a fine of at least 
$5000 per claim,140 the court would have to re-write the Act—an action 
obviously beyond the power of the courts. 
The courts have not given a definitive answer as to whether the FCA and 
the damages which it imposes are punitive or remedial.  Prior to the 
Amendments Act, the FCA provided for double damages and, in a qui tam suit, 
awarded the relator one half of those damages.141  In finding that the double 
damages provision was remedial in nature, the Supreme Court argued that “it 
can not be said that there is any recovery in excess of actual loss for the 
government, since in the nature of the qui tam action the government’s half of 
the double damages is the amount of actual damages proved.”142  However, 
with the addition of the Amendments Act in 1986, the FCA currently provides 
 
 137. Id. at 348. 
 138. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1981). 
 139. Id. at 266-71 (1981). 
 140. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a) (1994). 
 141. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 6-7, 12 Stat. at 698. 
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for recovery of treble damages, plus penalties of between $5,000 and $10,000 
per false claim.143  The Graber court concluded that these treble damages 
under the FCA were punitive “because they are not limited to, but rather 
substantially exceed, the actual damages suffered by the United States.”144 
In contrast to the district court decision in Graber, the Eighth Circuit in 
United States v. Brekke145 held that treble damages are not punitive.146  The 
United States government accused the Brekke defendants of submitting false 
real estate loan applications to the Small Business Administration.147  The 
Small Business Administration brought a civil suit against the defendants to 
recover its losses; however, it reached a settlement agreement with the 
defendants.148  The government brought a subsequent and separate criminal 
action under the FCA.149  The defendants argued that their earlier settlement of 
the civil action barred any subsequent criminal prosecutions, a position with 
which the district court agreed.150  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that a 
civil action under the Act is not punitive and, therefore, does not bar a 
subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct.151  The court held that 
the purpose of the Act was to help the government become whole through 
recovery of losses incurred.152  Quoting the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Halper,153 the Eighth Circuit argued that even a multiple recovery is 
compensatory, “unless the amount sought by the government ‘bears no rational 
relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss.’”154  The 
court further noted that the Halper court acknowledged that “in the ordinary 
case fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages . . . [did] no more than make the 
Government whole[]” because the damage to the Government includes costs 
that would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine, in addition to the actual 
losses resulting from a false claim.155  The Brekke court similarly categorized 
the FCA’s treble damages.156 
 
 143. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The relator receives between twenty-five to thirty percent of these 
damages if the government chooses not to intervene.  See id. § 3730 (d)(2). 
 144. Graber, 8 F. Supp.2d at 349. 
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[Act’s] treble damages provision is more compensatory than punitive”). 
 147. See Brekke, 97 F.3d at 1046. 
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 151. Id. at 1048-49. 
 152. Brekke, 97 F.3d at 1048-49. 
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The Supreme Court in Halper, however, went on to find that the excessive 
damages imposed on this particular defendant for violations of the FCA were 
punishment for purposes of double jeopardy.157  Therefore, it follows from 
Halper that if double damages can be considered punishment for double 
jeopardy purposes, they may also be considered punitive, thereby lending 
support to the argument that municipalities are not “persons” under the Act.  
Halper, however, was distinguished by the district court in United States v. 
Peters.158  The Peters court noted that Halper involved a defendant who 
submitted sixty-five separate Medicare false claims; thus, the defendant was 
liable for sixty-five separate penalties amounting to two hundred and thirty 
times the actual damages suffered by the government.159  Thus, the Court in 
Halper concluded that the damages incurred by the defendant were “so 
extreme and so divorced” as to inflict punishment rather than merely 
compensating the government for its losses.160  In Peters, however, even after 
trebling the government’s losses and deducting the investigative expenses, the 
defendant was liable for only twice the government’s actual proven 
damages.161  The Peters court concluded that, unlike the damages in Halper, 
the treble damages borne by the defendant in Peters were rationally related to 
compensating the government for its losses.162 
The reasoning of the courts indicates that the issue of whether the FCA’s 
treble damages and authorized penalties are punitive versus remedial remains 
open.  The trend seems to favor finding local governments liable under the 
FCA.  The Supreme Court has declined review of the one case that has reached 
the Courts of Appeals;163 consequently, inconsistent treatment will likely 
continue until another Court of Appeals’ decision creates a split among the 
Circuits to prompt certiorari. 
VI. DOES THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BAR SUIT? 
In Hans v. Louisiana,164 the Supreme Court held that states are immune 
from suit by individuals based on the Eleventh Amendment and the inherent 
nature of sovereignty.165  The Eleventh Amendment provides that states are 
immune from suits “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
 
 157. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49. 
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by Citizens of another State.”166  In Alden, the Court explained the basis for the 
states’ retention of sovereign immunity from private suits: 
A suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of the 
United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” . . . differs in kind from the suit of 
an individual: While the Constitution contemplates suits among the members 
of the federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures, the fear of 
private suits against nonconsenting States was the central reason given by the 
founders who chose to preserve the States’ sovereign immunity.  Suits brought 
by the United States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for 
each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad 
delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.167 
Thus, the issue appears to involve whether a suit brought or prosecuted by 
a private person against a state under the FCA, partially and perhaps primarily 
to benefit the federal government, fits within the safeguards that prompted 
states to consent to suits against them by the federal government as part of the 
Constitutional Convention.  The resolution of this issue requires some review 
of the involvement of the relator in a whistle blower action, especially when 
the government does not intervene.  The FCA provides that “[a] person may 
bring a civil action for a [FCA] violation . . . for the person and for the United 
States Government.”168  The statute clearly states, therefore, that the private 
person brings the action in part, on his or her own behalf.  The government has 
limited time to choose to intervene in the action.169  If the government 
intervenes, it is responsible for conduct of the action, but the private person 
remains a party to the action.170  If the government does not intervene, the 
private party is responsible for the conduct of the action.171 
According to the Alden majority, the founding fathers clearly contemplated 
that a suit on behalf of the federal government would be both “commenced and 
prosecuted” by those who can “exercise the political responsibility for each 
suit prosecuted.”172  All suits brought under the FCA’s qui tam provision are 
commenced by citizens and, if the federal government does not intervene, they 
are prosecuted by citizens.  Accordingly, no person entrusted with Alden’s 
“exercise of political responsibilities” is involved with the commencement or 
prosecution of the suits.  Unless Congress has authority to delegate federal 
power to commence suits against states to private citizens, FCA suits would 
not appear to survive constitutional muster under the Eleventh Amendment. 
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As evident from this analysis, the issue may turn on whether courts find 
that the federal government, not the relator, is the real party in interest.  While 
one court has held that the qui tam relator is the real party in interest,173 the 
weight of authority is that the United States government is the real party in 
interest, even when the government does not intervene. 
In 1999, the Fifth Circuit in United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech 
University174 avoided the question of whether a state is a “person” by first 
deciding the jurisdictional issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a 
qui tam action brought against a state or state agency.175  In Foulds, a medical 
resident brought a qui tam action against a State university alleging that “staff 
physicians routinely signed patient charts and Medicare/Medicaid billing forms 
certifying that the services were personally performed by the staff physicians 
or by the staff physicians’ employees under their personal direction,” even 
though the services had actually been performed by medical residents with no 
supervision.176  First, the court assumed “person” included states.177  The court 
then held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the private plaintiff, who is the 
real party in interest, from bringing a qui tam suit against a state; therefore, the 
court lacked authority to decide whether the FCA created a cause of action 
against the states by including states within the meaning of “person.”178 
The D.C. Circuit court in Long took the opposite approach from Foulds 
because, not only did the State fail to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity as 
a defense, but it also specifically requested that the court decide the statutory 
question first.179  The court initially decided that a state was not a “person” 
within the meaning of the FCA, thereby avoiding “the serious constitutional 
question of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars qui tam suits against the 
State in Federal court.”180  In a supplemental opinion, the concurrence argued 
that “the Eleventh Amendment bar on suits against the states in Federal court is 
not a garden variety jurisdictional issue” because states can waive immunity, 
giving federal courts the power to hear a case.181 
The Second Circuit in Stevens held that the federal government is the real 
party in interest in a qui tam suit under the Act, even when it chooses not to 
intervene.  The Stevens court noted: 
 
 173. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text. 
 174. 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 175. See id. at 281. 
 176. Foulds, 171 F.3d at 282. 
 177. Id. at 288. 
 178. Id. at 294. 
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In light of the fact that qui tam claims are designed to remedy only wrongs 
done to the United States, and in light of the substantial control that the 
government is entitled to exercise over such suits, we conclude that such a suit 
is in essence a suit by the United States and hence is not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.182 
The Stevens court, however, ignored the fact the FCA expressly provides that 
the suit is also brought on behalf of the individual, who is therefore a party to 
the suit who has complete control over the conduct of the suit if the federal 
government chooses not to intervene. 
The same conclusion was reached by the district court in United States v. 
Rockwell International Corp.183  The qui tam relators in Rockwell brought an 
action against the defendants for allegedly fraudulently charging the federal 
government for the costs associated with unauthorized production of personal 
items that were not covered under a federal defense contract.184  The 
defendants argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit against 
them.185  The court disagreed, finding that the United States’ decision not to 
intervene “does not change the suit’s character.” 186  Finding the United States 
to be the real party in interest, the court concluded that Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is not an available defense. 187 
In United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson 
Cancer Center,188 the Fourth Circuit similarly found the United States to be the 
real party in interest in FCA actions.189  The qui tam relator in Milam brought 
suit against a State university for submitting false research data to obtain 
federal grant monies.190  The university argued that it was immune from suit 
under Eleventh Amendment, and moved for dismissal.191  The district court 
denied the motion.  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit framed the primary issue as 
“whether the inapplicability of the Eleventh Amendment to suits brought by 
the United States extends to actions brought on the United States’ behalf by qui 
tam relators.”192  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
university’s motion and ruled that the United States remains the real party in 
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interest, even when it chooses not to intervene.193  Accordingly, the court 
found the Eleventh Amendment inapplicable to qui tam actions.194 
In United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Development Corp.,195 the Seventh 
Circuit added itself to the growing list of courts finding that the United States 
is the real party in interest in FCA qui tam actions.  The defendant in Hall 
argued that the relator did not have standing to bring the suit because the 
relator had not suffered an injury-in-fact.196  The court found “challenges to the 
standing of the government’s representative [to be] beside the point” because a 
qui tam relator sues on behalf of the United States.197  Thus, the court focused 
on the “the only [remaining] issue . . . [of] whether the United States, as the 
real plaintiff, has suffered a sufficient injury for purposes of [standing under] 
Article III.”198  The Milam court similarly noted that the government’s injury, 
and not the relator’s injury, confers standing; thus, it “could not lightly 
conclude that the party upon whose standing the justiciability of the case 
depends is not the real party in interest.”199 
In 1998, the Eighth Circuit in United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas200 
held that a qui tam action brought under the Act is a suit by the United States; 
therefore, the state may not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity.201  In 
Rodgers, the qui tam relators alleged that the State and its department of 
education falsely stated they were in compliance with the federal civil rights 
laws in order to obtain federal education funding.202  The court explained that 
even though the United States declined to intervene, “the structure of the qui 
tam procedure, the extensive benefit flowing to the government from any 
recovery, and the extensive power the government has to control the litigation” 
supported the conclusion that the United States remains the real party in 
interest.203  Moreover, the court pointed out that FCA provisions allowing qui 
tam relators to bring suit further the FCA’s purpose of preventing frauds on the 
federal government and increase the likelihood of recovery for losses.204  
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Accordingly, the court held that the FCA’s qui tam provisions “do not alter the 
underlying character of the action as one for the aggrieved party as defined by 
the statute,”205 and that the aggrieved party is the federal government.206  The 
Ninth Circuit in United States ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp.,207 similarly 
relied upon the Milam decision in agreeing that “[q]ui tam relators cannot and 
do not sue for [False Claims Act] violations on their own behalf . . . [but 
r]ather sue on behalf of the government as agents of the government, which is 
always the real party in interest.”208 
Courts have relied on four major factors in coming to the decision that the 
United States is the real party in interest in FCA qui tam actions: 
1. The federal government receives the majority of all monies 
recovered; 
2. The FCA governs false claims submitted solely to the federal 
government; 
3. The federal government has significant rights of control over a qui 
tam action even if it does not intervene; and 
4. Private individuals can only sue in the name of the federal 
government. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appear to support the courts’ 
conclusion.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) commands that “[e]very 
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,”209 and the 
Act requires qui tam actions “be brought in the name of the [federal 
g]overnment.”210  For these provisions to remain consistent, the United States 
must be the real party in interest.  But because the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure also state that the “real party in interest” is anyone authorized by 
substantive law to sue,211 and the FCA authorizes the qui tam relator to sue, it 
may also be argued that Rule 17(a) supports the position that the qui tam 
relator is the real party in interest. 
The district court in United States ex rel. Moore v. University of 
Michigan212 took an interesting approach to this issue.  The court held that the 
United States is the real party in interest in actions brought under the FCA 
provision authorizing qui tam actions in the name of the federal government,213 
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but that the private qui tam relator is the real party in interest in actions brought 
under the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision authorizing suits involving unlawful 
retaliatory employee terminations.214  Accordingly, the court ruled that the 
state and state agencies were entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity 
in wrongful termination suits brought by qui tam relators, but were not entitled 
to such a defense in false claim actions brought by qui tam relators.215 
As the above decisions indicate, it is apparent that the majority of courts to 
address the issue have held that the government is the real party in interest in a 
qui tam action.  However, not every court subscribes to that view.  
Unfortunately, none of these decisions focus on the underlying purposes of the 
Eleventh Amendment and the state sovereign immunity that were so prominent 
in the Court’s analysis in Alden, and will likely be of concern to the Court in 
Stevens. 
Those issues were clearly a concern of the Fifth Circuit in Foulds.216  The 
Foulds court found that “even though the United States may be a relevant 
‘party’ in this suit for some purposes of the litigation, the Federal Government 
certainly is not the acting party-of-record in this suit.”217  The court concluded 
that since the federal government chose not to intervene, the relator who 
brought the qui tam action was the party who had commenced and prosecuted 
the action.218  Thus, the federal government was held to be merely a passive 
beneficiary and, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit.219  
Although the Long court avoided the Eleventh Amendment issue by holding 
that states are not “persons” under the FCA, in dicta it argued that both the 
United States and the private plaintiff are real parties in interest because the 
FCA authorizes private persons to bring suit both for the federal government 
and for themselves.220  Since “the Eleventh Amendment must be satisfied for 
every claim in the suit,” the court stated that it seriously doubted the Eleventh 
Amendment would permit the qui tam relator’s claim against the state.221 
Even if the United States is held to be the real party in interest in a qui tam 
action, the Eleventh Amendment issues are not fully resolved.  There remains 
the issue of whether allowing suits by qui tam relators against the states 
involves an improper delegation of the federal government’s power to sue a 
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state.222  Suits brought by the federal government against states are brought by 
those under a constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.  A private 
plaintiff has no such duty and, therefore, may abuse the power to sue.  The 
D.C. Circuit in Long argued that allowing the federal government to delegate 
its Eleventh Amendment exemption to private plaintiffs creates an “all too 
easy . . . option” around the constraints on Congress’ power to abrogate states’ 
immunity.223 
Those same concerns for the improper delegation of the federal 
government’s power to sue are also evidenced in the Fifth Circuit’s separation 
of powers analysis in Riley.224  Article II of the Constitution vests the executive 
power in the President.225  That Article also requires the President to “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”226  The power of the Executive has 
been found to be unitary, that is, not subject to distribution among the other 
two branches of government.227  Article II’s Appointments Clause provides the 
President with the authority to execute the laws by vesting the President with 
the exclusive power to select the primary officers of the federal government, 
with the Senate’s consent.228  The Court has held that the Appointments Clause 
covers any government agent exercising significant authority under federal 
law.229  Taken together these three clauses work in unison in our constitutional 
structure to vest enforcement of the laws exclusively with the President and his 
or her appointed officers, subject to the President’s control.  In this context 
James Madison noted “I venture to assert that the Legislature has no right to 
diminish or modify his executive authority.”230  In Morrison v. Olson, the 
Court noted that anyone who exercises the executive authority must be subject 
to at least some reasonable control by the President or his or her agents.231  
These same Article II clauses also form the basis for the limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity that the states consented to during the constitutional 
convention, allowing suit by those in the federal government under a 
constitutional duty to execute the laws. 
Morrison involved a separation of powers challenge to the independent 
counsel statute.  The Court in that case considered whether the statute 
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impermissibly “reduce[d] the amount of control or supervision that the 
Attorney General and, through him, the President exercise[d] over the 
investigation and prosecution of a certain class of . . . criminal activity.”232 
Affirming the constitutional diminution of the President’s removal authority, 
the Court noted that the Attorney General could remove the independent 
counsel for misconduct or good cause.233  Morrison makes clear that the 
President must still retain ultimate authority over the faithful execution of the 
laws.  The apparent and perhaps fundamental flaw in the FCA is that it entrusts 
the initiation and prosecution of the laws to a private party and neither the 
President nor his lawful delegates can remove the relator, or limit his 
arguments or strategy in any way.234  This is the case whether or not the 
government joins in the action.  Only the court is allowed to silence a 
relator.235  Additionally, the relator can frustrate the Executive’s efforts to 
settle a case by objecting to that settlement, even when such objection only 
serves the relator’s interests.236  In some instances, such objections can take a 
year to resolve.237  Morrison forbids such an intrusion on the Executive’s 
authority.  These concerns are especially problematic when such interference 
with Executive authority breaches the promise made to the states during the 
constitutional convention that only those vested with the constitutional duty to 
execute the laws could bring an unconsented to suit against them. 
The court in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak238 doubted whether the 
federal government’s exemption from state sovereign immunity could be 
delegated.  The Blatchford court found that “[t]he consent, ‘inherent in the 
convention,’ to suit by the United States . . . is not consent to suit by anyone 
whom the United States might select . . . .”239  The Stevens court distinguished 
Blatchford by explaining that the plaintiffs in Blatchford were Native 
American tribes which brought suit against Alaska to remedy injuries the 
tribes, not the federal government, sustained.240  The Blatchford plaintiffs 
believed that their suit against the State was proper “because the United States 
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is empowered to bring suit for the benefit of the tribes.”241  The Stevens court 
further noted that the relator sues on behalf of the United States in a qui tam 
action under the FCA for injuries sustained by the United States, and not for 
injuries sustained by the private relator.242  Accordingly, using the Second 
Circuit’s analysis in Stevens, there is no need to delegate the federal 
government’s exemption from state sovereign immunity because the federal 
government is still the real party in interest.  But this position ignores the 
Morrison and Riley separation of powers concerns noted above. 
VII.  WHO CAN CLAIM ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY? 
If the courts conclude that Congress intended states, municipalities and 
their agencies to be included within the meaning of “person” for purposes of 
the Act, a cause of action against those entities for submitting false claims will 
be recognized.  If, however, it is adjudged that the federal government is not 
the real party in interest in a qui tam action in which it does not intervene, or 
that the United States government is unable to delegate its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity exemption to a qui tam relator, the courts will 
nevertheless be left with the question of which entities have the privilege of 
claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The Supreme Court has already 
found that a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits against states by 
private plaintiffs in both federal and state courts.243  Moreover, “[s]uits against 
state officials in their official capacity are considered to be suits against the 
individual’s office, and so are generally barred as suits against the State 
itself.”244 
The situations and circumstances in which a state agency may claim 
Eleventh Amendment immunity have also been fairly clearly prescribed.  A 
state agency may claim Eleventh Amendment immunity when the suit brought 
against it is considered to be, in fact, a suit against the state itself.  This 
determination is based on whether the judgment sought in the suit would 
actually be satisfied by the public fisc rather than agency funds: 
The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if the ‘judgment sought 
would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the 
public administration,’ or if the effect of the judgment would be ‘to restrain the 
Government from acting, or to compel it to act.’245 
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There is, however, an exception to this general rule.  When an action is brought 
against a state agency that is a separate entity, generating its own profits and 
responsible for its own debts, the action will not be considered one against the 
state, and the Eleventh Amendment will not bar the suit.246 
In Zissler, although the issue on appeal to the Eighth Circuit was whether 
or not states and state agencies fell within the FCA’s meaning of “person,” the 
court also addressed whether the defendant State university was entitled to 
claim Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in any situation in which the 
State itself could claim such immunity.247  In holding that states and state 
agencies were “persons” for purposes of the Act, the court also stated: “We 
agree with the University that it is an instrumentality of the State and is entitled 
to whatever immunities or defenses the State would have if sued in its own 
name.”248  It is, however, important to remember that when courts find that the 
United States is the real party in interest, as the Eighth Circuit did in Zissler, 
the state will be unable to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity against suit 
and, therefore, the state agency will also be precluded from raising the 
defense.249 
The question of whether a municipality or one of its agencies can claim 
Eleventh Amendment immunity has been answered in the negative in Alden.  
The Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity bars suits against states 
but not lesser entities, because “[t]he immunity does not extend to suits 
prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity which 
is not an arm of the State.”250  Since Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be 
claimed by a county or municipal corporation,251 the issue of whether an 
agency can claim Eleventh Amendment immunity depends upon whether the 
courts treat the agency “as an arm of the State partaking of the State’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, or is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or 
other political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not 
extend.”252  In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New 
York, however, the Supreme Court addressed the issue by determining that 
 
even though a State is not a named party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment.”). 
 246. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 52 (1994). 
 247. See Zissler, 154 F.3d at 871. 
 248. See id. at 871 n.2. 
 249. Id. at 872.  See also Rodgers, 154 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a state has no 
Eleventh Amendment immunity against a qui tam relator even when the government does not 
intervene). 
 250. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. 
 251. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). 
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“local government units . . . are not considered part of the State for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes.”253 
VIII.  DOES A PRIVATE PLAINTIFF HAVE STANDING TO SUE WHEN THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOES NOT INTERVENE? 
As previously noted, shortly before oral argument, the Court in Stevens 
requested briefing on the Article III standing of a relator under the FCA.  
Presumably, the request for supplemental briefing on an issue not raised in the 
proceedings below was premised upon the Court’s holding in Calderon v. 
Ashmus,254 in which the Court stated that standing must be established before 
considering the merits of any Eleventh Amendment challenge.255  In Calderon, 
the Court raised the standing issue sua sponte.  In Stevens, as noted earlier, the 
Court can dispose of the case by deciding that states are not “persons” under 
the FCA without addressing the Eleventh Amendment issue.  Nonetheless, by 
requiring briefing on the standing issue, the Court cleared the way to address 
standing, albeit with rather slim profferings by the parties in the dispute.  
Hopefully, the Court will allow relator standing to be addressed in another case 
wherein the issue is briefed and addressed in the lower courts and in the main 
briefs before the reviewing Court.  This section briefly identifies the key 
considerations surrounding relator standing, but the issue should be addressed 
more authoritatively on another occasion. 
Article III of the Constitution provides that federal court jurisdiction 
extends only to cases and controversies.256  In Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife,257 the Court described the three elements necessary to establish 
Article III standing: 
1. Plaintiff must have suffered and “injury in fact” which is “actual or 
imminent” and must “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual 
way;” 
2. Plaintiff’s alleged injury must be directly related to the defendant’s 
conduct; and 
3. Plaintiff’s alleged injury must be redressible by the requested 
relief.258 
Therefore, in order for a private plaintiff to maintain an action in federal 
court, that plaintiff must be able to meet these three elements of standing.  In a 
 
 253. Monell v. Department of Social Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.54 
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 254. 533 U.S. 740 (1998). 
 255. Id. at 745. 
 256. U.S. CONST. art 3, § 2. 
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 258. Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted). 
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qui tam action under the FCA the private plaintiff has not suffered a personal 
injury-in-fact but is merely suing on behalf of the federal government or the 
public at large for injuries suffered due to the alleged false claims made by the 
defendant.  While it is true that “Congress can . . . enact statutes creating new 
substantive legal rights, the invasion of which can give rise to the kind of 
particularized injury necessary to create standing[,]”259 the plaintiff must still 
have suffered an actual personal injury which can be redressed by the 
requested relief.  In other words, “Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing 
requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would 
not otherwise have standing [to sue].”260 
The lower court in Riley dismissed the qui tam relator’s case, holding that 
the relator had not established Article III standing because she lacked an 
injury-in-fact.261  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal on different grounds and stated that it was precluded from addressing 
the relator’s Article III standing by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Foulds,262 
which held that an uninjured qui tam plaintiff may have standing even if the 
government does not intervene.263  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit in Riley 
reluctantly concluded that its qui tam relator could have Article III standing.264  
Since the Foulds court’s limited discussion regarding standing was placed in a 
footnote, and was raised sua sponte without briefing from the parties,265 the 
concurrence in Riley argued that the Foulds court’s discussion of standing was 
only dicta and, therefore, was not controlling.266  However, while the majority 
in Riley characterized the conclusion in Foulds as “no more than a passing 
reference in a brief footnote,”267 it nonetheless held that the language was not 
dicta and was binding because standing is a justiciability issue that must be 
resolved before a court can adjudicate any remaining issues in a case.268 
The Foulds analysis remains questionable because the only authorities the 
Fifth Circuit relied upon were a pre-Lujan decision269 and a Supreme Court 
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decision which adjudicated an FCA suit without specifically addressing the 
standing issue because there was no objection to the qui tam relator’s 
standing.270  The fact that the Court requested additional briefing on the 
standing issue in Stevens shortly after publication of the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Riley suggests that the Supreme Court is concerned about the issue 
and is looking for a vehicle to address those standing concerns created by qui 
tam actions under the FCA. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The courts remain split on whether states are “persons” under the FCA and 
whether a qui tam relator may maintain an action against a state, county, or 
governmental agency.  But the trend in the Circuits has been towards allowing 
such suits.  There have been only two truly significant decisions holding the 
opposite, those being the D.C. Circuit in Long and the Fifth Circuit in 
Foulds.271  While only the D.C. Circuit case addressed the issue of whether 
“person,” as used in the Act, is broad enough to include states, both courts 
suggest that when the federal government fails to intervene in a qui tam action 
the Eleventh Amendment bars the relator from suing a state or state agency.  
One or both of these issues will be resolved by the Supreme Court in Stevens.  
The Court’s treatment of similar concerns during 1999 suggests that it will lean 
toward using the Eleventh Amendment to protect the state fisc, especially 
where, as here, the federal government has alternative remedies to make itself 
whole.272  However, the Court may choose to limit itself to the statutory issue 
by deciding that states are not “persons” under the FCA.273  Such a holding 
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